Source: Positions, row 4

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Philosophical

The bible has passages that challenge the notion of free will.

Refutation

This reflects a genuine and longstanding intramural debate within historic Christian orthodoxy — Augustinian/Reformed compatibilism, Arminian libertarianism, and Molinism (middle knowledge) all remain live, textually-argued positions, not evidence of scriptural incoherence. On the specific texts: the Exodus narrative displays reciprocal causation — Pharaoh hardens his own heart repeatedly (Exod 8:15, 8:32) well before the text says God hardens it, an ANE narrative convention (John Currid notes parallels in Egyptian royal ideology) that ascribes ultimate causality to the primary agent as a ratification of an already-settled moral trajectory, not an arbitrary override of a previously compliant will. Romans 9 is principally about God's sovereign freedom in choosing the corporate, redemptive-historical role of nations/lines (Jacob/Esau as representative of Israel/Edom, quoting Genesis and Malachi in a national context) within Paul's larger argument (Rom 9-11) wrestling with Israel's unbelief and culminating in the hope that 'all Israel will be saved' (Rom 11:26) — a framework of covenantal election-to-purpose, not a flat assertion that individuals have no responsiveness to grace. Even robust Reformed compatibilism (Jonathan Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*) affirms genuine secondary agency and responsibility: freedom is defined as unhindered voluntary action in accordance with one's own desires, which is compatible with those desires being part of a providentially ordered whole.

Positive case

Classical theism's doctrine of primary and secondary causality (Aquinas, concurrentism) explains how God's sovereign causality operates at the level of being itself while genuine creaturely freedom operates at the level of secondary causes — they are not two competing forces on the same plane fighting over the same causal 'slot,' so affirming both is not a contradiction but a recognition of different orders of causation.

Steelmanned objection

Texts describing God hardening Pharaoh's heart (Exod 4:21; 9:12), Paul's potter-and-clay argument (Rom 9:19-21), and Jesus's statement that no one can come to Him 'unless the Father draws him' (John 6:44) appear to teach a strong theological determinism in which human choices are unilaterally fixed by God, which seems incompatible with libertarian free will and with the coherence of holding those same people morally responsible and culpable for their 'choices.'

Incoherence of the alternative

The skeptic pressing this objection typically does so from a naturalistic framework in which all events, including human decisions, are the deterministic (or at best randomly indeterministic) output of prior physical states — a picture with even less room for libertarian free will or grounded moral responsibility than any Christian position on the table. Galen Strawson's 'basic argument' shows that naturalistic determinism cannot ground ultimate moral responsibility at all, since no one is causa sui (self-caused) in choosing the desires and character that determine their choices. The objector thus criticizes theism for a problem (reconciling sovereignty and responsibility) that theism has multiple serious proposed solutions for, while their own worldview has, on its own terms, no solution to the free-will/responsibility problem whatsoever.

Fallacy tags

none tagged

Sources cited

  • Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will — classical compatibilist account preserving responsibility
  • William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God — Molinist account of divine sovereignty and human freedom
  • John Currid, commentary on Exodus (EP Study Commentary) — on ANE background to the Pharaoh hardening motif
  • Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I q.83, q.105 — on primary/secondary causality and providence

Scripture referenced

Exod 4:21, Exod 8:15, Exod 8:32, Exod 9:12, Rom 9:19-21, Rom 11:26, John 6:44

Confidence

moderate

Review status

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