Psalm 139:16 says all the psalmist's days 'were written in your book before one of them came to be,' cross-referenced with Qur'an Surah 53:32, implying exhaustive divine predetermination incompatible with free will.
Refutation
This question is treated at length in this project's dedicated Free Will sheet; only the essential point is given here. Psalm 139 is worship poetry whose theme throughout is God's inescapable presence and intimate personal knowledge of the psalmist ('how precious are your thoughts to me, O God,' v. 17) — it is devotional celebration of being fully known and cared for, not a systematic philosophical treatise adjudicating the metaphysics of free will versus determinism. Classical Christian theology has developed multiple coherent frameworks holding together exhaustive divine foreknowledge with genuine creaturely freedom without collapsing into determinism: the Boethian/Thomistic view of God's eternal, timeless knowledge of the whole of history 'at once' (rather than an earlier temporal cause forcing a later effect), the Molinist account of divine middle knowledge, and various compatibilist accounts. None of these require reading Psalm 139:16 as a technical claim that God causally determines every choice; the verse is naturally read as affirming God's complete foreknowledge and providential care, which is a different claim from causal determinism.
Positive case
Classical accounts of divine providence and creaturely freedom (Aquinas's doctrine of concurrence, ST I.83 and I.105.4-5) hold that God's causal action at the level of being itself does not compete with, but rather grounds, genuine secondary causation by free creatures — a both/and rather than either/or account.
Steelmanned objection
If God ordained/wrote out the entirety of a person's life before it happens, human choices are not genuinely free but are predetermined by divine decree; the fact that both major monotheisms contain similar fatalistic-sounding language suggests theism generally is committed to a determinism that undermines moral responsibility.
Incoherence of the alternative
If naturalism is true, physical causal determinism (or at best a mix of determinism and blind quantum randomness, neither of which grounds libertarian freedom) governs all human choices at least as thoroughly as any theological account of foreordination; the free-will objection therefore cannot be raised uniquely against theism without equally undermining free will on a purely naturalistic account of the mind.
Fallacy tags
none tagged
Sources cited
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.14, I.83 — on divine foreknowledge, providence, and concurrence
- William Lane Craig, writings on divine foreknowledge and Molinism — on reconciling exhaustive foreknowledge with libertarian freedom
Scripture referenced
Ps 139:16
Confidence
moderate
Review status
no content-completeness issues flagged
Source locator
Specific Issues → row 33 locator: medium confidence
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