Islamic hadith material on Muhammad and slavery: (1) Muhammad reportedly reversed a dying man's emancipation of six slaves, freeing only two and re-enslaving four (Sahih Muslim, via Imran b. Husain). (2) Muhammad owned the slave Mariyah the Copt as a concubine, per al-Tabari and other hadith, with disputed reports on whether/when he freed or married her. (3) Sahih Muslim 8:3371: Companions had intercourse with captive women taken at the Muraysi expedition while practicing coitus interruptus, with Muhammad's approval. (4) Sahih Muslim (Book 17:41): after the battle of Hunayn, Companions hesitated to have intercourse with captive married women because their husbands were still living polytheists, until a Qur'anic verse (4:24) was reportedly revealed permitting it. (5) Muhammad personally purchased and owned a slave, per a hadith from Jabir.

These rows concern the Islamic prophetic tradition and Islamic legal sources, not a direct claim about Christian scripture, so a full comparative-religions treatment is outside the scope of a Bible-focused response to this sheet (the actual biblical texts on slavery are engaged directly in sex-slavery-001 through sex-slavery-006). But insofar as this material is being deployed argumentatively as 'every scripture-based tradition is equally compromised on slavery, so the Christian appeal to comparative ANE restriction, hardness-of-heart accommodation, and canonical trajectory toward abolition is special pleading,' that inference is a false equivalence, because the traditions are not structurally symmetrical on this specific point. In Sunni Islamic theology, Muhammad is the uswa hasana, the 'beautiful example' (Qur'an 33:21), and the final, perfecting prophet, whose recorded conduct — especially as transmitted in a collection graded sahih ('authentic'), like Sahih Muslim — functions as normative sunnah for all time, with no internal doctrine of a fallen institution being progressively restrained and superseded. The biblical case, by contrast, differs in kind: the Torah's own case law already legislates restriction and eventual release (Ex 21:2, 16, 26-27; Lev 25; Deut 23:15-16, discussed at length in sex-slavery-002 and sex-slavery-003); Jesus explicitly supplies a hermeneutical principle for reading certain Mosaic case-law provisions as concession to hardness of heart rather than creational ideal (Matt 19:8); and the canon's own trajectory (Philemon 1:16; Gal 3:28) presses toward the abolition that later Christian reformers — Wilberforce, the Clapham Sect, Bartolomé de las Casas — explicitly carried out using these very texts as warrant. A tradition that contains within its own canon the theological resources later used to overturn the practice is not equivalent to a tradition whose central legal-exemplary figure's own conduct on this point remains normatively binding sunnah. This is offered as a comparative historical observation, not a blanket polemic against Islam; a fuller, dedicated treatment belongs on a comparative Qur'an/hadith sheet rather than this one.

The distinctiveness of the Christian canonical trajectory toward abolition (see sex-slavery-003) is the operative positive case here as well: a tradition whose own texts supply the warrant for ending the practice is doing something structurally different from a tradition whose founder's conduct remains normative sunnah.