'God is Not All Knowing,' supported by Genesis 22:12 ('now I know that you fear God') and the 'testing to know' language of Deuteronomy 8:1-2 ('testing you to know what was in your heart') and Deuteronomy 13:3 ('the Lord your God is testing you, to know whether you indeed love the Lord').
Refutation
This is a real interpretive crux and deserves a real answer, not a wave of the hand. The key lexical fact is that the Hebrew verb *yada'* ('to know') has a notably broad semantic range that includes not only propositional/intellectual cognition but experiential, relational, and declarative-evidential senses — 'Adam knew Eve' (Gen 4:1) is experiential, not a report of Adam acquiring new propositional information; 'the Lord knows the way of the righteous' (Ps 1:6) is relational approval, not discovery. Gordon Wenham's commentary on Genesis (WBC) reads Genesis 22:12's 'now I know' (*'attah yada'ti*) as marking the point at which Abraham's fear of God is *actualized and demonstrated in history* — made real, public, and narratively complete — not the moment God's private epistemic state changes. The test does not inform God; it forms Abraham, and it reveals Abraham to Abraham, to Isaac, and to every subsequent reader of the text, who now 'know' Abraham's faith the same way. This distinction between (a) theoretical/dispositional knowledge, which God has completely and eternally, and (b) the actualized, historically-enacted exercise of a virtue, which comes into concrete existence only when performed, resolves the tension without denying anything the text says. The same applies to Deut 8:1-2 and 13:3: these are paraenetic (hortatory) covenant texts addressed to Israel's practical, historical experience in the wilderness — their rhetorical purpose is pedagogical for the human party ('remember the long way the Lord your God has led you... in order to humble you'), describing divine pedagogy from the narrative's own temporal vantage point, exactly as ANE covenant/suzerain treaties use testing and probation language toward vassals whose loyalty must be historically demonstrated, not toward informing the suzerain's private knowledge. Decisive internal biblical evidence against the naively literal reading: Deuteronomy itself, only chapters later, has God say through Moses, 'I know what they are inclined to do even now, before I have brought them into the land that I promised' (Deut 31:21) — explicit, prior, exhaustive foreknowledge of Israel's future apostasy, asserted in the same book, by the same divine speaker, as the 'testing to know' formula. A single author/tradition cannot coherently mean 'God is ignorant until events unfold' in Deut 8 and 13 while asserting confident foreknowledge of Israel's future free choices in Deut 31 unless the 'testing to know' language was never meant as a literal epistemic-gap report in the first place. This is the classical Christian doctrine of scriptural accommodation: Augustine (*De Genesi ad litteram*, and throughout *City of God*) treats anthropomorphic divine speech and action as God's condescension to human modes of understanding; Calvin makes this explicit and vivid (*Institutes* 1.13.1): God 'accommodates the knowledge of himself to our slight capacity' and, like a nurse who 'lisps' in speaking to an infant, describes himself to us in terms suited to our creaturely understanding, though he infinitely transcends them. Philosophically, Aquinas (ST I, q.14, a.13) directly treats God's knowledge of future contingents, including free creaturely acts, arguing they are known by God not as future (successively, as they would be to a creature bound by time) but as present within the single eternal 'now' from which God apprehends the whole of time at once — Boethius's *totum simul* (*Consolation of Philosophy*, Book V). On this account 'now I know' is true and non-metaphorical *from Abraham's position inside time*, without requiring any change, sequence, or acquisition *in God*, who has no 'before' relative to the event to have been ignorant in. Honest concession: this is a genuinely disputed area in contemporary philosophy of religion — Molinism, simple foreknowledge, Ockhamism, and open theism all offer competing accounts of the relationship between divine eternity, foreknowledge, and creaturely freedom, and the exegesis of these specific texts is part of that live debate, not a settled slam-dunk on either side.
Positive case
Accommodation is not an ad hoc rescue device invented to save omniscience from embarrassing texts; it is a recognized, independently-motivated principle for how an infinite, simple, eternal God communicates with finite, narrative, temporally-embedded creatures at all. Scripture consistently depicts God relating to his covenant people through genuine historical drama, delay, testing, and response — and the culmination of this pattern of divine accommodation to human categories is the Incarnation itself, where the eternal Word enters time fully. The 'testing to know' texts are, read this way, not embarrassing residue of an earlier, more primitive theology but small-scale instances of the same divine condescension that reaches its fullest expression at Bethlehem.
Steelmanned objection
These are not marginal proof-texts; they are structurally central to three major narrative/legal units (the Akedah, and two separate Deuteronomic covenant-instruction passages). In each, God explicitly frames an action as designed to produce knowledge he does not yet possess — 'now I know,' 'to know what was in your heart,' 'to know whether you indeed love.' On a plain reading, this implies real, temporally prior ignorance resolved by an empirical test, which is exactly what serious philosophically-informed open theists (Gregory Boyd, John Sanders) argue: that God's exhaustive knowledge of the past and present is complete, but libertarian free future choices are not yet actual and therefore not yet knowable even to God, so God genuinely learns how creatures will act as they act. If Scripture is read as a coherent whole rather than filtered through a prior philosophical commitment, these texts deserve to carry real interpretive weight rather than being explained away by definitional fiat ('well, God is timeless, so this can't really mean what it says').
Incoherence of the alternative
Classical theism rejects open theism's central move — that God's knowledge is 'dynamic,' complete regarding everything actual but genuinely incomplete regarding future free choices not yet in being — for two convergent reasons. Exegetically, the texts asserting unrestricted, timeless divine foreknowledge (Isa 46:9-10, 'declaring the end from the beginning'; Deut 31:21, in the very same book as the 'testing' texts; Dan 2; Ps 139) are more numerous, more direct, and occur in didactic/prophetic-assertion contexts, whereas the 'testing to know' texts occur exclusively in narrative and paraenetic contexts whose genre independently explains the human-vantage-point phrasing — so the exegetical burden favors accommodation, not concession. Philosophically, open theism, in order to preserve libertarian creaturely freedom, must attribute to God a real, unrealized potency — the capacity to learn, to be informed, to move from not-knowing to knowing as time unfolds. But a being with unrealized potency is not Pure Act (*actus purus*); it is composite, partly potential and partly actual, and therefore itself contingent and in need of further explanation — which is precisely the role God is invoked to fill as the terminus of the Thomistic arguments from motion and causality. A god who can still learn something is one more thing-in-the-universe-of-becoming, not the ground of being; it forfeits the very metaphysical role that makes theism (as opposed to a very powerful finite deity within a larger reality) coherent as an ultimate explanation. This is also why open theism remains a minority, modern (chiefly late-20th-century evangelical) position standing against the patristic-medieval-Reformation consensus — Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Calvin — which grounds God's knowledge of future contingents in his eternity as an undivided, all-at-once 'now,' not an infinitely extended timeline on which God, like us, must simply wait to find things out.
Fallacy tags
equivocation
Sources cited
- Gordon Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary: Genesis 16-50 — on the demonstrative, not investigative, function of 'now I know' in Genesis 22:12
- John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.13.1 — the 'lisping nurse' image of divine accommodation
- Augustine of Hippo, De Genesi ad litteram; City of God — on accommodated, anthropomorphic divine speech
- Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V — eternity as totum simul, the 'whole simultaneous' possession of all time
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.14, a.13 — God's knowledge of future contingents and free creaturely choices
- Gregory Boyd, God of the Possible — open theist reading of the 'testing to know' texts, engaged and answered
- John Sanders, The God Who Risks — open theist account of dynamic omniscience, engaged and answered
Scripture referenced
Genesis 22:12, Deuteronomy 8:1-2, Deuteronomy 13:3, Deuteronomy 31:21, Isaiah 46:9-10, Psalm 1:6, Genesis 4:1
Confidence
concedes-difficulty-but-not-fatal
Review status
no content-completeness issues flagged
Source locator
Omniscient → row 13 locator: medium confidence
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