Source: Christianity Summary, row 5, 6, 7

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Philosophical

'Jesus impregnating his Mother - Lev 18:7 - God impregnated Mary, Jesus is the Lord.' / 'Jesus impregnating a virgin betrothed to another - Deuteronomy 22:23-24' / 'Jesus performing a child sacrifice - Lev 18:21; Deut 18:10-12'

Refutation

Each mapping fails because it equivocates on the legally load-bearing term in each statute — it borrows the statute's label while stripping out the very facts the statute's definition actually requires. This is a category error dressed as a citation. **(a) Lev 18:7 and the Virgin Birth.** The incest law addresses 'uncovering your father's nakedness' through sexual relations with your mother — a statute that presupposes (i) an act of ordinary human sexual union and (ii) an existing father whose marital/paternal right is thereby violated. Luke's account of the conception of Jesus explicitly excludes both elements: 'The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you; therefore the child to be born will be called holy, the Son of God' (Luke 1:34-35). Mary's own question — 'How will this be, since I am a virgin?' — and the angel's answer are constructed precisely to rule out any sexual act. Whatever the conception of Jesus theologically is, the New Testament is emphatic that it is *sui generis*, a unique creative act with no male biological contributor and therefore no 'uncovering' of any human father's marital right at all. Applying an incest statute — whose entire legal force depends on ordinary human paternity and coitus — to an event the source text goes out of its way to describe as non-sexual and without a human father is a category error: the necessary conditions of the statute's own definition are simply absent. **(b) Deut 22:23-24 and Joseph's rights.** This statute punishes a man who has sexual relations with a woman betrothed to another, because it violates the betrothed husband's exclusive marital right. The narrative gives no human sexual agent at all (see (a)), so there is no violation of Joseph's right by *any* third party to begin with. Moreover, Matthew's account (Matt 1:18-25) shows Joseph informed of the truth by direct angelic revelation and choosing, as 'a righteous man,' to proceed with the marriage and to raise the child — the opposite of an aggrieved husband whose rights were violated without his knowledge or consent. Both necessary elements of the statute (a human violator, an unwitting/nonconsenting husband) are absent. **(c) Lev 18:21/Deut 18:10-12 and the crucifixion.** The Molech legislation forbids the ritual killing of a living child, typically by fire, as an offering to a rival deity — its defining features are (i) a victim who is a child, (ii) coercion/lack of consent by the victim, (iii) an act performed by one party (a parent or priest) to appease a distinct, rival god. None of these obtain in the crucifixion as the New Testament actually presents it: the crucified Jesus was an adult in the fullness of his public ministry, decades after his birth; the act is presented throughout as the Son's own voluntary self-offering, not something done *to* an unwilling victim *by* a separate, rival deity (John 10:17-18, 'No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord'; Gal 2:20). Trading on the surface resemblance 'a deity, a death' while ignoring that every element the statute actually specifies — a child victim, coercion, a rival god — is absent, is a clear case of equivocation: using the label 'child sacrifice' while discarding its defining content.

Positive case

Correctly understood, the Virgin Birth is a unique divine creative act (paralleling, and going beyond, God's initial creative acts in Genesis) rather than a sexual union, and the Crucifixion is the willing self-oblation of the divine Son rather than a coerced killing imposed by an external party — both facts the New Testament states explicitly and repeatedly, which is precisely why the classical tradition (e.g., the Council of Ephesus's affirmation of Mary as *Theotokos*, or Aquinas's treatment of the hypostatic union, *ST* III q. 32) took such care to describe the conception in non-physical, wholly gracious terms, and why the Gospels emphasize Christ's active, willing agency at the cross (Matt 26:53-54; John 19:11) rather than portraying him as a passive victim.

Steelmanned objection

Steelmanned, this is a coherent rhetorical strategy, not just mockery: since Jesus is identified as God, and the Virgin Birth and Crucifixion are attributed to God's direct action, the objection applies the Torah's own legal categories consistently to those events — incest law (Lev 18:7, uncovering a father's nakedness through the mother), adultery against a betrothed woman's rightful husband (Deut 22:23-24), and child sacrifice to a deity (Lev 18:21; Deut 18:10-12) — and argues that, judged by the Bible's own legal standards, the conception and death of Jesus would themselves be condemned acts. This is an internal-consistency challenge: 'if your own law defines these categories of act as forbidden, and your own theology describes God performing acts that fit those categories, your theology indicts itself by its own standard.'

Fallacy tags

equivocation, category error

Sources cited

  • Gordon Wenham, Leviticus (NICOT) — on the legal definition and presuppositions of Lev 18:7 and 18:21
  • Raymond E. Brown, The Birth of the Messiah — critical analysis of the infancy narratives and the non-sexual character of the virginal conception
  • Peter Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy (NICOT) — on the presuppositions of Deut 22:23-24
  • Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 32 — on the manner of Christ's conception

Scripture referenced

Lev 18:7, Deut 22:23-24, Lev 18:21, Deut 18:10-12, Luke 1:34-35, Matt 1:18-25, John 10:17-18, Gal 2:20

Confidence

strong

Review status

no content-completeness issues flagged

Source locator

Christianity Summary → row 5, 6, 7

Related arguments

3 of 8 in Christianity Summary